000			01718cam a2200229 4500500
005			20250413012710.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aMarty, Frédéric _eauthor
700	1	0	_a Pillot, Julien _eauthor
700	1	0	_a Pillot, Julien _eauthor
245	0	0	_aIntellectual Property Rights, Interoperability and Compulsory Licensing: Merits and Limits of the European approach
260			_c2012.
500			_a88
520			_aThe Essential Facilities Doctrine, albeit an American case-law creation, is also implemented in the European Union. While, since Trinko (2004), the US Supreme Court seems to challenge its implementation, European antitrust authorities tend to extend this doctrine to intangible assets. Focusing on European case-law, we observe several differences between American and European competition policies. This article highlights these dissimilarities - which are going much further than the sole implementation of the EFD - and underlines both the principles and the limits of the European approach. As a final purpose, this work tries to point up some of these differences’ origins. In this way, we argue that, if the US and the EU antitrust authorities are consistent with their respective conceptions of competition, these policies are not neutral on the innovation incentives.JEL Codes: K21, L13, L86
690			_aabuse of dominance
690			_acompulsory licencing
690			_aessential facilities doctrine
690			_aexclusionary strategy
786	0		_nJournal of Innovation Economics & Management | 9 | 1 | 2012-04-16 | p. 35-61
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/revue-journal-of-innovation-economics-2012-1-page-35?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c1106262 _d1106262