| 000 | 01131cam a2200205 4500500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 005 | 20250413013637.0 | ||
| 041 | _afre | ||
| 042 | _adc | ||
| 100 | 1 | 0 |
_aFayet, Héloïse _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aFrom Cuba to Ukraine: Strategic signaling and nuclear deterrence |
| 260 | _c2024. | ||
| 500 | _a16 | ||
| 520 | _aStrategic signaling — a set of signs and maneuvers designed to lend credibility to the threat of using nuclear weaponry, outside wartime — has made a come-back. The war in Ukraine has given it a new meaning, on both the Russian and the Western sides. Both nuclear and conventional forces can contribute to strategic signaling. Attention must also be paid to the development of new technologies, which can modify access to information and its interpretation. politique étrangère | ||
| 690 | _aNew technologies | ||
| 690 | _aNuclear strategy | ||
| 690 | _aStrategic signaling | ||
| 690 | _aWar in Ukraine | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nPolitique étrangère | o 244 | 4 | 2024-12-09 | p. 159-171 | 0032-342X | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-politique-etrangere-2024-4-page-159?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
| 999 |
_c1108481 _d1108481 |
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