000 01503cam a2200217 4500500
005 20250112024115.0
041 _afre
042 _adc
100 1 0 _aLabelle, Réal
_eauthor
700 1 0 _a Thibault, Marc
_eauthor
245 0 0 _aEarnings Management in Response to Environmental Crises: A Test of the Political Cost Hypothesis
260 _c1998.
500 _a57
520 _aMajor environmental crises have disastrous effects on political visibility of the firms involved. Loss of life and social or external costs derived from such disasters attract public attention to those firms. Government may be induced to discipline managers by forcing them to incur costs to clean up and reduce the risk of accident. This paper uses the political costs related to 10 major environmental crises and a model similar to Jones 1991, Cahan 1992, and DeAngelo et al. 1994 to conduct on a longitudinal and cross-sectional basis an empirical test of the political-cost hypothesis where size is replaced by occurrence of an environmental crisis. The signs of all variables in the model match the predicted sign and are significant except for the proxy for environmental crises.
690 _aearnings management
690 _aenvironmental crises
690 _apolitical costs
690 _apolitical visibility
786 0 _nAccounting Auditing Control | Volume 4 | 1 | 1998-01-01 | p. 69-81 | 1262-2788
856 4 1 _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-accounting-auditing-control-1998-1-page-69?lang=en
999 _c144696
_d144696