000			01720cam a2200217 4500500
005			20251109010613.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aDi Giacomo, Alexandre _eauthor
700	1	0	_aPrinz, Enrico _eauthor
245	0	0	_aDo CEOs Manipulate R&D Expenses to Increase their Bonus? French Evidence
260			_c2025.
500			_a23
520			_aDo top executives engage in the manipulation of real activities to boost their short-term compensation? By combining hand-collected compensation data with firm-level information, we analyze the link between adjustments in research and development (R&D) expenses and bonus plans of French CEOs, focusing on the CEO’s bonus position. Utilizing panel data, we observe a negative relationship between bonus achievement levels and changes in R&D expenses. Notably, companies whose CEOs fail to meet their target bonus show lower growth in R&D expenses and are more likely to reduce such expenses. Adjustments in R&D expenses further rely on bonus criteria and occur more frequently when performance indicators underlying the bonus depend more heavily on pre-depreciation and amortization measures, which are impacted by R&D expenses. Our findings, remaining significant after robustness checks, corroborate prior research indicating that top executives manipulate earnings-based bonus plans to inflate their short-term compensation. JEL Classification: G34, M12
690			_abonus plan
690			_aCEO compensation
690			_aearnings management
690			_aR&D expenses
786	0		_nFinance | 46 | 2 | 2025-07-04 | p. 132-171 | 0752-6180
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-finance-2025-2-page-132?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c1561849 _d1561849