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041 _afre
042 _adc
100 1 0 _aBouzahzah, Mohamed
_eauthor
700 1 0 _a Docquier, Frédéric
_eauthor
700 1 0 _a Paddison, Oliver
_eauthor
245 0 0 _aPensions, Growth, and Inequalities in the Presence of Myopic Individuals
260 _c2002.
500 _a69
520 _aThis article discusses an endogenous growth model involving myopic agents. Like Feldstein (1985), we have assumed that the discount rates of the utility and future income of economic agents are multiplied by a myopia factor distributed uniformly over [0.1]. Within this framework, the creation of a pure pay-as-you-go system not only reduces growth but also inequalities within generations. In a period of stable growth, a funded system generally makes it possible to achieve the same fairness objectives while stimulating the growth rate. The article examines the possibility of switching from a pure pay-as-you-go system to pre-funding: the presence of myopic agents significantly raises the transition costs borne by the first generations.
690 _agrowth
690 _apensions
690 _ainequalities
690 _ainterlaced generations
690 _amyopia
786 0 _nEconomie & prévision | o 155 | 4 | 2002-10-01 | p. 31-44 | 0249-4744
856 4 1 _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-economie-et-prevision-1-2002-4-page-31?lang=en
999 _c156730
_d156730