000 | 01415cam a2200205 4500500 | ||
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005 | 20250112031857.0 | ||
041 | _afre | ||
042 | _adc | ||
100 | 1 | 0 |
_aBerson, Clémence _eauthor |
700 | 1 | 0 |
_a Ferrari, Nicolas _eauthor |
245 | 0 | 0 | _aWhat effects have ANI measures had in reducing labour market segmentation? A matching model simulation |
260 | _c2017. | ||
500 | _a83 | ||
520 | _aThe French labour market is segmented between people who enjoy stable employment and those who alternate between temporary contracts and periods of unemployment. Using a simulation run on a matching model calibrated to France, the reform that resulted from the national multisector agreement (ANI) signed in 2013 appears able to reduce this divergence. The ANI, signed on 11 January 2013, introduced modulated social contributions, with surcharges on temporary contracts (CDDs) and exemptions for hiring young people on permanent contracts (CDIs). The estimated effects of these modulated social contributions are positive but not as significant as in the fairly similar “Italian-style” reform studied in Berson and Ferrari (2015). | ||
690 | _apublic policy | ||
690 | _asegmentation | ||
690 | _atemporary jobs | ||
786 | 0 | _nÉconomie & prévision | o 211-212 | 2 | 2017-12-18 | p. 115-137 | 0249-4744 | |
856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-economie-et-prevision-2017-2-page-115?lang=en |
999 |
_c157332 _d157332 |