000			01450cam a2200205 4500500
005			20250112031932.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aStraeten, Karine Van der _eauthor
245	0	0	_aElectoral Competition and Negative Taxation: The Informational Inactivity Trap
260			_c2002.
500			_a84
520			_aThe tax burden on labour can weigh on the economy not only in terms of underemployment and reduced growth, but there is also a danger of an informational shortfall. While it is difficult to obtain information on the productive capacities of non-employed individuals, taxation, by depressing employment, will reduce the information available to society about itself. The authors take a dynamic model in which tax policy in each period is chosen by voting. Voters’beliefs regarding the productivity distribution determine tax policy, which in turn determines employment, which in turn determines voters’revised beliefs. At steady state, the tax rate and the non-employment rate are at least as high as they would have been if the productivity distribution had been known with certainty at the start.
690			_alabour market
690			_alearning process
690			_ataxation
690			_aelectoral competition
786	0		_nEconomie & prévision | o 156 | 5 | 2002-12-01 | p. 107-123 | 0249-4744
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-economie-et-prevision-1-2002-5-page-107?lang=en
999			_c157602 _d157602