| 000 | 01286cam a2200169 4500500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 005 | 20250112034106.0 | ||
| 041 | _afre | ||
| 042 | _adc | ||
| 100 | 1 | 0 |
_aGinglinger, Edith _eauthor |
| 700 | 1 | 0 |
_a Hamon, Jacques _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aOwnership, control and market liquidity |
| 260 | _c2012. | ||
| 500 | _a60 | ||
| 520 | _aWe examine how ownership concentration and the separation of ownership and control affect secondary-market liquidity in France. We find that firms with a large insider blockholder exhibit significantly lower liquidity. However, different methods of enhancing control affect liquidity in different ways. Pyramid structures impair market liquidity. Double voting right shares, a French specific means of control enhancement rewarding long-term shareholders and restraining insiders from trading their shares, lead to increased liquidity, especially for family firms. Our results suggest that by using double voting rights to enhance their control, a transparent decoupling mechanism, rather than pyramids, an opaque decoupling mechanism, blockholders offer higher secondary-market liquidity to outside investors. | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nFinance | 33 | 2 | 2012-12-01 | p. 61-99 | 0752-6180 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-finance-2012-2-page-61?lang=en |
| 999 |
_c166641 _d166641 |
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