000			01619cam a2200241 4500500
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041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aHervier, Louise _eauthor
245	0	0	_aReforming in the Presence of Veto Players
260			_c2014.
500			_a81
520			_aThis article analyzes the reforms of unemployment insurance in the 2000s in France and Germany, in terms of the power of unions. It poses the question of how and why unions have let reforms that weaken their role in management and their ability to guide reforms in this sector occur, while in both Bismarckian countries they were deemed veto players. This contribution highlights the explanatory, specific and common procedures in each country, and shows how political strategies combine with union divisions and new alliances between some social partners and governments explain the feasibility of such reforms. It points out that these structural reforms, also known as “constitutives”, which are infrequently submitted to examination, are a decisive factor in the “distributive” or allocative reforms (Lowi, 1972) that they allow to be introduced or developed at a later stage.
690			_aunemployment insurance
690			_apôle emploi
690			_aHartz reforms
690			_aunions
690			_aself-administration
690			_acomparative politics (France-Germany)
690			_ainstitutional change
786	0		_nGouvernement et action publique | 3 | 3 | 2014-10-01 | p. 55-78 | 2260-0965
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-gouvernement-et-action-publique-2014-3-page-55?lang=en
999			_c169843 _d169843