000			02184cam a2200313 4500500
005			20260329002409.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aChesnel, Jonathan _eauthor
700	1	0	_aHendrickx, Marion _eauthor
245	0	0	_aReverend Bayes, phenomenology and babies
260			_c2021.
500			_a65
520			_aThis article will attempt to show that it is not possible to question the infant’s experience during the first weeks of life by observing his or her behavior only. Data from Bayesian cognitive science and phenomenology offer us a much more relevant perspective on the infant’s experience during this period. This double approach allows us to imagine the perceptive experience of the newborn as probably abundant and likely to be magmatic. It is then possible to wonder about what enables the progressive emergence of this perceptive magma. The other appears in this way as an organizer of oneself and of the world before being a regulator of oneself (to use an expression of Stern, 1989). Finally, we will show that if the other is the organizer of oneself and of the world, this has consequences on the way in which we can consider the child’s path to distinguish emotions from one another and to differentiate his or her emotions from those of others. The infant’s perception is perhaps not unlike some features of the perception of subjects with autism–what Pellicano and Burr (2012) have called hypo-priors. Although of course, because of holding, when parents and children are well enough, there can be no question of a normal autistic phase (Mahler, 1967).
690			_aBayesian statistics
690			_aindifferentiation
690			_aintersubjectivity
690			_anewborn
690			_aperception
690			_aphenomenology
690			_aBayesian statistics
690			_aindifferentiation
690			_aintersubjectivity
690			_anewborn
690			_aperception
690			_aphenomenology
786	0		_nLa psychiatrie de l’enfant | 64 | 2 | 2021-09-22 | p. 37-57 | 0079-726X
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-la-psychiatrie-de-l-enfant-2021-2-page-37?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c1814532 _d1814532