000			01379cam a2200169 4500500
005			20250112052336.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aLobez, Frédéric _eauthor
700	1	0	_a Statnik, Jean-Christophe _eauthor
245	0	0	_aThe Trade-Off between Cost and Credit Availability and Debt Concentration
260			_c2001.
500			_a71
520			_aIn this work, we built a model of bank-enterprise relationships in an adverse selection situation. The informational problem is resolved by a double device. First, firms choose the number of potential lenders, then banks deduce some information of debtors’quality, therefore, we obtain a semi-separating equilibrium. On the other hand, banks complete the solution of informational problem by using separating contracts where the separation is based on the pair (rate; likelihood of rationing). Then the model permits to link the debt concentration, the credit cost and the credit availability to the firm’s risk. So, we show that more risky firms prefer fewer number of potential lenders. On the contrary, the fewer risky firms prefer more potential lenders: they limit the possibility of credit rationing. Classification JEL: G21
786	0		_nRevue économique | 52 | 6 | 2001-12-01 | p. 1227-1250 | 0035-2764
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2001-6-page-1227?lang=en
999			_c206013 _d206013