000 01760cam a2200205 4500500
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041 _afre
042 _adc
100 1 0 _aJaaidane, Touria
_eauthor
245 0 0 _aThe economics of national representation and the remuneration of French parliamentarians
260 _c2017.
500 _a32
520 _aIn this contribution, we have gathered data on the French Parliament and French parliamentarians in order to enhance our understanding of their different missions (law-making, representation, and monitoring activities). The analysis of data on the number, characteristics, and activities of representatives on the one hand, and that of the data on the budgets of the assemblies on the other, display a number of different changes. First, the representatives benefit from a generous pension system, but their base salary has declined in real terms, while other elements (such as expenditure allowances to cover expenses that arise in the course of their parliamentary activities) of their compensation package have increased. Second, the French National Assembly shows great stability in terms of a weak representativeness and a long-lasting multiple-office holding practice. Finally, parliamentary activity has increased. These evolutions shed light on selection issues as well as the incentive to work—issues that matter for the functioning of representative democracies.
690 _a Elected representatives pay
690 _a multiple-office holding
690 _a moonlighting
690 _a parliamentaryactivity
786 0 _nRevue d'économie politique | 127 | 5 | 2017-11-28 | p. 913-956 | 0373-2630
856 4 1 _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-d-economie-politique-2017-5-page-913?lang=en
999 _c206336
_d206336