000			01794cam a2200157 4500500
005			20250112052428.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aRouillon, Sébastien _eauthor
245	0	0	_aIrreversible Climatic Catastrophe, Uncertainty, and Progress of Knowledge
260			_c2001.
500			_a4
520			_aClimate policy claims a reflexion about public decisions under uncertainty. This work focuses on the case where a risk of catastrophe of unknown range is anticipated for pollution levels greater than a certain critical threshold. If constrained by the initial information, the best decision is to accept this risk when relevant expected welfare exceeds the certain welfare of preservation. In reality, the present best decision also bears with future information. The optimal strategy must take advantage of it. The question is then to know whether this incitates to pollute more or less today. Our analysis indicates that the answer depends upon the process of information arrival, and, therefore, upon the social planner ability to influence it. If the signals are emitted by the environment, the social planner can shorten the time until the arrival of future information, simply by accelerating the rate of accumulation of greenhouse gases. In such a case, learning incitates to pollute more. If the arrival of information follows an autonomous process, the social planner loses his ability to influence this delay and decides only the level of pollution when the information comes. In this case, it is impossible to determine whether or not an irreversibility effect exists. Classification JEL: Q28
786	0		_nRevue économique | 52 | 1 | 2001-01-01 | p. 61-90 | 0035-2764
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2001-1-page-61?lang=en
999			_c206410 _d206410