000			01972cam a2200169 4500500
005			20250112052432.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aDeffains, Bruno _eauthor
700	1	0	_a Doriat-Duban, Myriam _eauthor
245	0	0	_aBalance and Regulation of the Legal Services Market
260			_c2001.
500			_a59
520			_aMatching supply with demand in justice is made possible via the variations in delays between the moment the case enters into the phase of deliberation and the moment of the judgment. The question is to know whether this rationing by waiting periods is efficient. The answer is no because the increase in waiting lists shows that the parties must wait increasingly longer to obtain a verdict from the courts. Identifying the different factors determining the demand for justice enables us to envisage other ways of controlling the flow of litigation which may decrease the time necessary to obtain a judgment. This consists in acting upon the time period allocated to the exchange of documents and to the open debate so as to reduce the length of the trial. However, there is the risk that this reduction in the duration of proceedings may well increase the demand for justice, so that the deliberating period will lengthen whilst the supply of justice remains fixed. The second idea consists in increasing the supply of justice. The failure of policies aimed at controlling through time and the presence of costs in the demand for justice will lead us to explore methods of control via proceedings costs. Two possibilities can be imagined: increasing the cost of access to justice and a redistribution of trial costs between the parties. In both cases, the aim is to encourage the parties to prefer a settlement rather than a judgment. Classification JEL: K4
786	0		_nRevue économique | 52 | 5 | 2001-10-01 | p. 949-974 | 0035-2764
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2001-5-page-949?lang=en
999			_c206460 _d206460