000			01769cam a2200217 4500500
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041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aMercier Ythier, Jean _eauthor
245	0	0	_aNon-paternalistic Benevolence, Consumption Externalities and the Liberal Social Contract
260			_c2018.
500			_a55
520			_aWe examine the regulation of general consumption externalities by the liberal social contract. First-best liberal social contracts redistribute individual wealth and determine the level of provision of public commodities to achieve a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources that is unanimously preferred to the allocation of a hypothetical initial situation of perfect communication. We show that the social welfare functionals that aggregate individual social preferences by means of the generalized bargaining solution of Nash support the liberal social contract if they verify non-paternalistic benevolence, that is, if the associate social welfare functions are strictly increasing in the private welfare of all individuals. The existence of a liberal social contract follows as a corollary of this property of supportability. We characterize the liberal social contract as a case of application of Habermas’s norms of communicative action to the allocation of scarce resources by public finance and the market.
690			_a consumption externalities
690			_a liberal social contract
690			_a communicative action
690			_a non-paternalistic benevolence
690			_a Nash social welfare function
786	0		_nRevue d'économie politique | 128 | 2 | 2018-05-15 | p. 267-296 | 0373-2630
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-d-economie-politique-2018-2-page-267?lang=en
999			_c206749 _d206749