| 000 | 00925cam a2200217 4500500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 005 | 20250112052611.0 | ||
| 041 | _afre | ||
| 042 | _adc | ||
| 100 | 1 | 0 |
_aForges, Françoise _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aCooperation under incomplete information: Some strategic models |
| 260 | _c2017. | ||
| 500 | _a20 | ||
| 520 | _aStarting from a Bayesian game that accounts for agents’ interaction in the absence of any cooperation agreement, we examine some scenarios that enable the players to commit to decisions. We compare the effects of these scenarios and suggest some links with contract theory. | ||
| 690 | _acooperation | ||
| 690 | _aincentives | ||
| 690 | _acommitment | ||
| 690 | _acontract | ||
| 690 | _aincomplete information | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nRevue d'économie politique | 127 | 4 | 2017-08-31 | p. 467-493 | 0373-2630 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-d-economie-politique-2017-4-page-467?lang=en |
| 999 |
_c207085 _d207085 |
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