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| 005 | 20250112060241.0 | ||
| 041 | _afre | ||
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| 100 | 1 | 0 |
_aMaigné, Carole _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aRealism According to Johann Friedrich Herbart. A Critique |
| 260 | _c2002. | ||
| 500 | _a55 | ||
| 520 | _aThis is a study of the metaphysics and psychology of Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841). A former student of Fichte, Herbart broke very early with the idealist current of the age. His philosophy of knowledge proposes an unorthodox reading of Kant, namely a realist and empiricist reading which rejects the invention of the transcendental. Refusing a critique of reason and of our capacity to know, Herbart sees his work as taking forward the critical legacy by elaborating a metaphysics of being and a wholly original psychology, to which he ascribes the status of a science, supported by mathematics. The realist ontology takes up the Kantian principle which sees being as a position, thus forcing us to leave the concept for the experience, but aims also to fill the gap between the phenomenon and the thing in itself, which implies a redefinition of substance. His psychology breaks with the psychology of the faculties – accepted by Kant – which does not criticise our supposed capacity to know, and thus initiates a redefinition of representation. | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nRevue de métaphysique et de morale | o 35 | 3 | 2002-09-01 | p. 305-323 | 0035-1571 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-de-metaphysique-et-de-morale-2002-3-page-305?lang=en |
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_c221832 _d221832 |
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