000			01713cam a2200217 4500500
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041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aSalvat, Christophe _eauthor
245	0	0	_aBehavioral paternalism
260			_c2015.
500			_a80
520			_aOver the last decade, a new type of paternalism has emerged thanks to the groundbreaking works of some behavioral economists. This new type of paternalism, which I refer to here as Behavioral Paternalism (BP), has become popular through Sunstein and Thaler’s “nudge theory” and challenges the view that paternalism is unacceptable today. The aim of this paper is to assess its moral legitimacy (not exclusively focusing on its alleged libertarian nature). The results of my investigation can be summarized as follows. Though BP is usually acknowledged for its “libertarian” character, it does not satisfy the conditions of what is considered, since Feinberg, as “soft paternalism.” Nevertheless, BP has a strong point that has been underestimated by its partisans: it first withstands Anderson’s equality argument. Unlike traditional forms of paternalism, BP is not demeaning and does not ostracize any category of people. Lastly, BP can prove to be genuinely altruistic. This, however, is dependent upon the abandoning of Sunstein and Thaler’s main assumptions.
690			_aautonomy
690			_apaternalism
690			_aethics
690			_abehaviorism
690			_aequality
786	0		_nRevue de philosophie économique / Review of Economic Philosophy | 15 | 2 | 2015-01-28 | p. 109-130 | 1376-0971
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-de-philosophie-economique-2014-2-page-109?lang=en
999			_c224117 _d224117