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041 _afre
042 _adc
100 1 0 _aZwarthoed, Danielle
_eauthor
245 0 0 _aCheap preferences and intergenerational justice
260 _c2015.
500 _a87
520 _aThis paper focuses on a specific challenge for welfarist theories of intergenerational justice. Subjective welfarism permits and even requires that a generation, G1, inculcates cheap preferences in the next generation, G2. This would allow G1 to deplete resources instead of saving them, which seems to contradict the ideal of sustainability. The aim of the paper is to show that, even if subjective welfarism requires the cultivation of cheap preferences among future generations, it can accommodate two major objections to cheap preferences engineering, the Autonomy Objection and the Fairness Objection. The paper argues that teaching autonomy-related abilities is compatible with cheap preferences engineering insofar as autonomy is understood as an end-state and not as a precondition. Furthermore, teaching autonomy-related abilities could even be required in order to improve G2’s prospects for well-being. However, since being autonomous renders G2 able to revise their initially cheap preferences, G1 should also save enough resources to enable members of G2 to do so. Therefore, cultivating cheap preferences among G2 does not allow G1 to deplete the available resources. Classification JEL : D60, I31.
690 _aautonomy
690 _aintergenerational justice
690 _aeducation
690 _acheap preferences
690 _aequality
786 0 _nRevue de philosophie économique / Review of Economic Philosophy | 16 | 1 | 2015-06-01 | p. 69-101 | 1376-0971
856 4 1 _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-de-philosophie-economique-2015-1-page-69?lang=en
999 _c224146
_d224146