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001			88811674
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005			20250107133658.0
006			m o d
007			cr un
008			250107s2010 fr | o|||||0|0|||eng d
020			_a9789814328470
035			_aFRCYB88811674
040			_aFR-PaCSA _ben _c _erda
100	1		_aOng, Chit Chung
245	0	1	_aOperation Matador _bWorld War II - Britain's Attempt to Foil the Japanese Invasion of Malaya and Singapore _c['Ong, Chit Chung']
264		1	_bMarshall Cavendish Editions _c2010
300			_a p.
336			_btxt _2rdacontent
337			_bc _2rdamdedia
338			_bc _2rdacarrier
650		0	_a
700	0		_aOng, Chit Chung
856	4	0	_2Cyberlibris _uhttps://international.scholarvox.com/netsen/book/88811674 _qtext/html _a
520			_aWhen Singapore fell to the Japanese in February 1942, Churchill called it the “largest capitulation in British history.” Till today, the myth persists that this was due to the British forces’ being caught off-guard, with their guns facing the wrong direction—towards the sea. This book offers an alternative insight into why Malaya and Singapore were captured by the Japanese. The question of the landward defence of Singapore and Malaya was first raised as early as 1918, eventually taking the form of Operation Matador, the elaborate planning and preparations for which amply demonstrate that the British fully expected the Japanese to attack Singapore from the rear, and had formulated a plan to stop the Japanese at the Kra Isthmus. Yet, when the Japanese forces landed, they found Malaya and Singapore defended by an emasculated fleet, obsolescent aircraft, inadequate artillery and no tanks. The battle for Malaya and Singapore was lost even before the first shot was fired—in the corridors of power at Whitehall. Churchill’s half-hearted support for Operation Matador meant that Malaya was starved of the necessary reinforcements, and the commanders on the spot were expected to “make bricks without straw.” The question that remains: If implemented, might Operation Matador have stopped the Japanese?
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