000			02042cam a2200301 4500500
005			20250118040238.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aBourdeau, Michel _eauthor
245	0	0	_aL'idée de point de vue sociologique.
260			_c2004.
500			_a1
520			_aSUMMARY Comte is not only the first to have explicitly said that each science needed its own philosophy ; he also developed a new conception of the relations between science and philosophy : the Cours aims not so much to make philosophy scientific as to make science philosophical. If, from now on, we must philosophise from a sociological point of view, it is because sociology is not just a science among others : it is also in charge of the co-ordination of knowledge as a whole. This priority of the social standpoint has two main reasons. First, it is in agreement with the move from absoluteness to relativity, which is one of the best characteristics of positivism. Every cognition is relative in two respects : to its object, but also to its subject. Second, it has to do with the social role of science, which conversely justifies a social control of science, either directly by the citizens, or indirectly by some experts. We end with some remarks about the subjective method, which Comte adopted after 1848 and which is often held responsible for the many oddities of his late philosophy.
690			_aAuguste Comte
690			_aRôle social de la science
690			_aPositivisme
690			_aInternalisme et externalisme
690			_aRelativisme
690			_aPhilosophie des sciences
690			_aAuguste Comte
690			_aSocial function of science
690			_aPhilosophy of science
690			_aRelativism
690			_aPositivism
690			_aInternalism and externalism
786	0		_nCahiers internationaux de sociologie | 117 | 2 | 2004-09-01 | p. 225-238 | 0008-0276
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/revue-cahiers-internationaux-de-sociologie-2004-2-page-225?lang=fr&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c353114 _d353114