000			01476cam a2200169 4500500
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100	1	0	_aLordon, Frédéric _eauthor
700	1	0	_a Ould-Ahmed, Pepita _eauthor
245	0	0	_a“The Loser Pays”
260			_c2007.
500			_a38
520			_aFor reasons going far beyond economic analysis, European law on competition loathes state aid to companies in difficulty. A case study on the rescue of the Credit Lyonnais reveals the principle: the Commission criticises the fact that because companies know they can benefit from state aid, they take rash risks without assuming the consequences. State assistance is blameworthy insofar as it goes against the “moral rule of the market” according to which bankruptcy is the normal sanction of poor management. Therefore, the Commission stigmatizes less the distortions to competition generated by state aid than what is viewed as far more reprehensible forms of distortion: market ethics and the natural business life and death. The considerable guarantees the Commission requests before it authorizes aid can be seen as a sort of punishment substituted for the pains of bankruptcy or restructuring that the company “normally” would have had to face.
786	0		_nCritique internationale | o 33 | 4 | 2007-01-17 | p. 55-78 | 1290-7839
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-critique-internationale-2006-4-page-55?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c416515 _d416515