000			01641cam a2200157 4500500
005			20250119124158.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aGuillon, Jean-Baptiste _eauthor
245	0	0	_aConspiracy theories and the paradox of epistemic individualism
260			_c2019.
500			_a13
520			_aThis paper is a contribution to the litterature on the epistemology of conspiracy theories. I discuss and tackle two approaches to the phenomenon, namely the “hyper-critical” approach and the “no problem” approach. The “hyper-critical” approach says that the development of conspiracy thinking is due to a lack of “critical thinking” and, as a therapy, this approach proposes to teach pupils to trust noone and verify every bit of information. I respond that this strategy of “epistemic individualism” is inefficient and even counter-productive, because a careful study of conspiracy talk reveals that conspiracists have exactly this same individualistic epistemology. The “no problem” approach denies that there is any such problematic phenomenon as “conspiracy theories”. It relies on the difficulty to define exactly what counts as a conspiracy theory and to argue why it is (as such) epistemically problematic. I respond by providing a definition of conspiracy thinking as an overdevelopment of epistemic individualism, i.e. as the unability to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy testimonial sources.
786	0		_nDiogenes | o 261-262 | 1 | 2019-10-18 | p. 54-87 | 0419-1633
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-diogene-2018-1-page-54?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c419809 _d419809