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041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aBarsotti, Bernard _eauthor
245	0	0	_a"The "Motivated Judgment" and Its Intensity"
260			_c2005.
500			_a65
520			_aIn his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874,1911,1914-1917), Brentano laid the basis for an intentional conception of the act of consciousness. But what exactly consist of the contribution, on several occasions denied, of Psychology to the phenomenological, Husserlian conception of intentionality? Following the steps of Brentanian analysis makes clear that his contribution is not on the subjective side of noetic consciousness, as usually said, but on the side of the intentional object, which Brentano gives a renewed meaning to, through the reconsideration of the sensualistic idea of intensity of representation in terms of motivation by the object-pole.
690			_aMotivation
690			_aBrentano
690			_aIntentional object
690			_aJudgment
690			_aIntentionality
786	0		_nArchives de philosophie | Volume 68 | 3 | 2005-09-01 | p. 465-491 | 0003-9632
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-archives-de-philosophie-2005-3-page-465?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c451017 _d451017