000			01582cam a2200217 4500500
005			20250121025243.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aMbonda, Ernest-Marie _eauthor
245	0	0	_aJohn Rawls on the Foundations of Rights and Metaphysical Neutrality
260			_c2009.
500			_a85
520			_aIs it possible for a theory of justice to be metaphysically neutral ? John Rawls, in his paper published in 1985 and titled “Justice as Fairness: Political, not Metaphysical”, as well as in his book Political Liberalism published in 1995, defended the thesis that a theory of justice which is supposed to be applied to a liberal and democratic society should not be rooted in a comprehensive doctrine, but, on the contrary, must be confined to a formulation of rules of political conduct and repartition of goods which is metaphysically neutral. From an alternative standpoint, this paper is an attempt to show that such neutrality is not verified in Rawls’ argumentation, especially when human rights’ justification is concerned, and that this failure in implementing neutrality is what helps to preserve all the critical strength of Rawls’ theory as compared to other doctrines as utilitarianism.
690			_aHuman Rights
690			_aContract
690			_aLiberalism
690			_aProcedural Justice
690			_aNeutrality
786	0		_nArchives de philosophie | Volume 72 | 1 | 2009-04-21 | p. 101-122 | 0003-9632
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-archives-de-philosophie-2009-1-page-101?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c451215 _d451215