000			01604cam a2200265 4500500
005			20250121025818.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aEhrsam, Raphaël _eauthor
245	0	0	_aThe theory of reference in Putnam. Between conceptual determinants and real determinants
260			_c2016.
500			_a15
520			_aPutnam endorses two seemingly opposite claims about reference and the content of mental states. According to Putnam’s semantic externalism in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” (1975), reference or intentionality demands that words and mental states bear a relation to the world as it is, independently of our language and thoughts. Meanwhile, according to Putnam’s internal realism in Reason, Truth and History (1981), one cannot think about or refer to an object without making use of a certain conceptual network and entertaining a certain set of beliefs. Is the conjunction of these claims consistent? This paper argues that it is, and indeed corresponds to a core element of Putnam’s thought, since such a conjunction is the sole way to avoid what Putnam calls in 1999 “the antinomy of realism.”
690			_aReference
690			_aInternal realism
690			_aMeaning
690			_aKey words
690			_aTruth
690			_aPutnam
690			_aIntentionalité
690			_aSemantic externalism
690			_aRealism
786	0		_nArchives de philosophie | Volume 79 | 4 | 2016-10-28 | p. 655-674 | 0003-9632
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-archives-de-philosophie-2016-4-page-655?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c451940 _d451940