| 000 | 01343cam a2200253 4500500 | ||
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| 005 | 20250121030410.0 | ||
| 041 | _afre | ||
| 042 | _adc | ||
| 100 | 1 | 0 |
_aGide, Benoît _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aFreedom and necessity in Hume |
| 260 | _c2023. | ||
| 500 | _a44 | ||
| 520 | _aHow does Hume’s skepticism concerning necessary connections allow for his solution to the question of liberty and necessity? First, we claim that an epistemological (rather than semantical) reading of this skepticism is sufficient to allow for the necessitarian element of the solution. Then, we claim that the compatibilist element of it depends on Hume’s naturalistic explanation of the inference of the mind from actions to motives. Because this naturalist explanation is itself skeptical in nature, we finally qualify Hume’s overall answer to the problem of liberty and necessity as a reconciling skeptical solution. | ||
| 690 | _anaturalism | ||
| 690 | _askepticism | ||
| 690 | _acompatibilism | ||
| 690 | _anecessitarianism | ||
| 690 | _anaturalism | ||
| 690 | _askepticism | ||
| 690 | _acompatibilism | ||
| 690 | _anecessitarianism | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nArchives de philosophie | Volume 86 | 3 | 2023-06-21 | p. 47-70 | 0003-9632 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-archives-de-philosophie-2023-3-page-47?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
| 999 |
_c452454 _d452454 |
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