000			01545cam a2200193 4500500
005			20250121033014.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aCompernolle, Tiphaine _eauthor
245	0	0	_aThe Collective Construction of External Auditor Independence: The Role of the Audit Committee
260			_c2009.
500			_a25
520			_aAlthough the external auditor-s independence is usually described as an individual characteristic, it can actually be considered a collective construction on which the audit committee exerts influence. To explore this influence, the study relies on 24 interviews, analyzed from the theoretical perspective proposed by Crozier and Friedberg (1977). My analysis examines power games taking place between directors, external auditors, and the financial management. These power games could play a key role in the construction of the external auditor-s independence. More particularly, these games could create constraints, reassurance, and opportunities for external auditors in their “quest” for independence. The paper thus proposes an innovative view of the concept of independence: independence being at the confluence of numerous subjectivities interlinked in various power games.
690			_apower games
690			_aauditor independence
690			_aaudit committee
786	0		_nAccounting Auditing Control | Volume 15 | 3 | 2009-12-01 | p. 91-116 | 1262-2788
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-accounting-auditing-control-2009-3-page-91?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c454531 _d454531