000			02019cam a2200253 4500500
005			20250121034039.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aHourquebie, Fabrice _eauthor
245	0	0	_aReflections on the constitutional judge and the question of values
260			_c2022.
500			_a63
520			_aA reflection on whether and how the Conseil Constitutionnel takes account of “values” may seem paradoxical, such is the legitimacy it enjoys in the French tradition arising from its allegiance to the constitution and its capacity for self-restraint in keeping attempts at opportunistic control at bay. And yet it is difficult to believe that a constitutional judge can rule without taking account of a minimum of context-based reference values, by which we mean extra-legal considerations of a moral, economic, social and even political or ideological nature. But recognising this fact amounts to upsetting a number of certainties: it would overturn the notion of the constitutional judge’s syllogistic reasoning; the interpretation of the constitution would begin slide towards a finalistic, realistic or consequentialist type of justificatory approach, these being the characteristics of the theory of living constitutionalism; and interpretation would no longer be an act of knowledge but an act of will. And what if a form of constitutional pragmatism were to become the new standard in the light of which the legitimacy of the Conseil Constitutionnel is evaluated?
690			_aRéalisme juridique
690			_aPouvoir d’interprétation
690			_aLiving constitutionalism
690			_aCONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL
690			_aLégitimation sociale
690			_aConséquentialisme
690			_aInterprétation finaliste
690			_aRéférences extra-juridiques
786	0		_nLes Cahiers de la Justice | o 1 | 1 | 2022-03-17 | p. 7-14 | 1958-3702
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-les-cahiers-de-la-justice-2022-1-page-7?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c455724 _d455724