000			01370cam a2200217 4500500
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041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aDupuy, Katia _eauthor
700	1	0	_a Lanfranchi, Joseph _eauthor
245	0	0	_aAbsolute or Relative Performance: How Do French Firms Determine Their Wage Bonuses?
260			_c2004.
500			_a24
520			_aThis article analyses employers’choice to base merit bonuses on relative performance. The relative element consists in comparing workers’output and its major advantage is to eliminate the mutual uncertainty they bear. However, bonuses based on relative performance theoretically encourage workers not to cooperate with their colleagues. Using a primary sample of 15,859 private-sector French firms in 1992, we show that bonuses based on relative performance are more likely to be chosen when output and sales fluctuate. In contrast, they are used less frequently when firms adopt an organisation of work based on task-sharing and cooperation between workers.
690			_aperformance
690			_arelated bonuses
690			_aorganisation of work
690			_arelative performance
786	0		_nEconomie & prévision | o 162 | 1 | 2004-03-01 | p. 71-94 | 0249-4744
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-economie-et-prevision-1-2004-1-page-71?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c468135 _d468135