000			01270cam a2200205 4500500
005			20250121053604.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aFleckinger, Pierre _eauthor
700	1	0	_a Glachant, Matthieu _eauthor
245	0	0	_aAre Corporate Social Responsibility and Voluntary Agreements Complementary?
260			_c2009.
500			_a71
520			_aVoluntary agreements between regulators and firms have been in use for at least two decades. In recent years, however,firms have tended to commit to better environmental or social behavior in a more unilateral fashion. This phenomenon is known as the rise of “Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR). In such circumstances, are voluntary agreements still welfare-enhancing? To explore this question, we use a policy game involving a regulator and a firm. We show that the answer is ambiguous. In particular, it depends on the regulator’s bargaining power.
690			_aPreemption of Public Regulation
690			_aCorporate Social Responsibility
690			_aVoluntary Agreements
786	0		_nEconomie & prévision | o 190-191 | 4 | 2009-12-28 | p. 95-105 | 0249-4744
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-economie-et-prevision-1-2009-4-page-95?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c468576 _d468576