| 000 | 01543cam a2200241 4500500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 005 | 20250121053634.0 | ||
| 041 | _afre | ||
| 042 | _adc | ||
| 100 | 1 | 0 |
_aSami, Hind _eauthor |
| 700 | 1 | 0 |
_a Joubert, Nadia _eauthor |
| 700 | 1 | 0 |
_a Rullière, Jean-Louis _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aGood Is Better Than the Best: An Experimental Approach to Control as a Filtering Mechanism |
| 260 | _c2012. | ||
| 500 | _a14 | ||
| 520 | _aIn an adverse-selection context, we use an experimental protocol to study the intensity and efficiency of a control policy as filtering instrument in the long-term financing relationship between an investor (principal) and an entrepreneur (agent). We find three control effects: a disciplining effect, an educative effect, and a filtering effect. While the first is expected, the educative effect of control gives way to a crowding-out effect already observed in other tests but in a moral-hazard context. Lastly, our experiment shows that the principal restores a filtering effect through a trade-off between control efficiency and control intensity: it is better to control little in order to detect a little, rather than control a lot and detect nothing. | ||
| 690 | _afiltering | ||
| 690 | _aprincipal-agent model | ||
| 690 | _along-term relation | ||
| 690 | _aadverse selection | ||
| 690 | _acontrol | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nEconomie & prévision | o 195-196 | 4 | 2012-10-01 | p. 127-146 | 0249-4744 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-economie-et-prevision-1-2010-4-page-127?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
| 999 |
_c468720 _d468720 |
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