| 000 | 01499cam a2200241 4500500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 005 | 20250121053635.0 | ||
| 041 | _afre | ||
| 042 | _adc | ||
| 100 | 1 | 0 |
_aFinon, Dominique _eauthor |
| 700 | 1 | 0 |
_a Defeuilley, Christophe _eauthor |
| 700 | 1 | 0 |
_a Marty, Frédéric _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aPrice Signals and Long-Term Equilibrium: Re-Thinking Organizational Forms in Electricity Markets |
| 260 | _c2013. | ||
| 500 | _a25 | ||
| 520 | _aThe decentralised electricity market model illustrates several market flaws in the linkage between short-term and long-term decisions. Because of highly specific problems of risk management and market incompleteness, the model does not allow effective allocation of investment in base-load and peak-load capacities leading to an optimal generation system. This makes it necessary to (1) establish regulations to provide a credible basis for remunerating generation capacity, so as to create incentives for investment in peak-load units; (2) accept vertical arrangements enabling operators to share risk with consumers, even if these arrangements constitute market imperfections that will constrain competition. | ||
| 690 | _ainvestment | ||
| 690 | _avertical integration | ||
| 690 | _amarkets | ||
| 690 | _arisk management | ||
| 690 | _acontracts | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nEconomie & prévision | o 197-198 | 1 | 2013-06-07 | p. 81-104 | 0249-4744 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-economie-et-prevision-1-2011-1-page-81?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
| 999 |
_c468732 _d468732 |
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