| 000 | 01527cam a2200181 4500500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 005 | 20250121055021.0 | ||
| 041 | _afre | ||
| 042 | _adc | ||
| 100 | 1 | 0 |
_aAlonzo, Anne _eauthor |
| 700 | 1 | 0 |
_a Deffains, Bruno _eauthor |
| 700 | 1 | 0 |
_a Tallec, Ronan _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aPublic choice and monopoly: the ‘privilege’ of the royal mirror factory and how it was controlled during the Ancien Régime |
| 260 | _c2020. | ||
| 500 | _a73 | ||
| 520 | _aEconomic theory considers monopolies as harmful to consumer and community welfare. In an imperfect market, however, state regulation can be socially beneficial and subsidized companies can act as if they are in a competitive market. From this perspective, research in political economy has challenged the one-sided vision of market institutions. Public choice economists have studied the origins of these mechanisms but historians have argued that their vision of the past is anachronistic and utilitarian. This study of the Royal Mirror Factory’s “privilege” during the Ancien Régime confirms the relevance of this analytical framework and suggests that, under specific conditions, the consumer can indeed benefit from state control over monopolies. It especially explains why temporary “privileges” were constantly renewed under the Ancien Régime in France. | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nEntreprises et histoire | o 100 | 3 | 2020-10-28 | p. 22-38 | 1161-2770 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-entreprises-et-histoire-2020-3-page-22?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
| 999 |
_c471483 _d471483 |
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