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100	1	0	_aHege, Ulrich _eauthor
700	1	0	_a Mella-Barral, Pierre _eauthor
245	0	0	_aBond exchange offers or collective action clauses?
260			_c2019.
500			_a24
520			_aThis paper examines two prominent approaches to design efficient mechanisms for debt renegotiation with dispersed bondholders: debt exchange offers that promise enhanced liquidation rights to a restricted number of tendering bondholders (favored under U.S. law), and collective action clauses that allow to alter core bond terms after a majority vote (favored under U.K. law). We use a dynamic contingent claims model with a debt overhang problem, where both hold-out and hold-in problems are present. We show that the former leads to a more efficient mitigation of the debt overhang problem than the latter. Dispersed debt is desirable, as exchange offers also achieve a larger and more efficient debt reduction relative to debt held by a single creditor.
690			_ahold-out problem
690			_aexit consent
690			_atrust Indenture act
690			_aout-of-court restructuring
690			_acollective action clause
690			_aexchange offer
690			_ahold-in problem
786	0		_nFinance | 40 | 3 | 2019-12-18 | p. 77-119 | 0752-6180
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-finance-2019-3-page-77?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c486622 _d486622