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_aMédard, Frédéric _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aThe German Supreme Command and Military Tanks, 1916-1918: Incomprehension or Deliberate Impasse? |
| 260 | _c2012. | ||
| 500 | _a68 | ||
| 520 | _aAt the end of the First World War, Allies were convinced that tanks brought them victory while the German supreme command had not understood the offensive potential of this new equipment. Nevertheless, when tanks appeared in September 1916, they were not designed to serve German war aims. Surrounded by Allies, and placing its hopes only in a negotiated peace, Berlin used steel to build submarines in an attempt to break the enemy supplies’ sea routes. German units employed captured tanks on the battlefield. Above all, Germany produced many new weapons and developed tactics to counter this new arm. | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nGuerres mondiales et conflits contemporains | o 247 | 3 | 2012-09-01 | p. 35-50 | 0984-2292 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-guerres-mondiales-et-conflits-contemporains-2012-3-page-35?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
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_c492008 _d492008 |
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