000			01608cam a2200157 4500500
005			20250121090557.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aDewalque, Arnaud _eauthor
245	0	0	_aValidity of Meaning or Ideality of Significance?
260			_c2008.
500			_a41
520			_a— In this article, I postulate that there are several varieties of logical antipsychologism, to which correspond various concepts of “pure logic”. Two conceptions are here under discussion : Husserl’s “logic of ideality” and Rickert’s “logic of validity”. Against the equivocal use of “validity” and “ideality” by Heidegger, I first show that none of those conceptions can be exactly superimposed on the other one, because Rickert agrees with Husserl’s antipsychologism but rejects his theory of significations. It then appears that this difference – which is particularly obvious in Rickert’s unpublished review of Palágyi’s very controversial book –, reveals in fact a “weak point” in Husserl’s Logical Investigations : the confusion between logical and mathematical objects (a confusion which will be later recognized by Husserl himself). Rickert’s “axiological” alternative avoids directly this confusion by asserting the irreducibility of the propositional sense – which is grounded on pure “theoretical values” – to an ideal object.
786	0		_nLes Études philosophiques | o 84 | 1 | 2008-02-26 | p. 97-115 | 0014-2166
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-les-etudes-philosophiques-2008-1-page-97?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c509756 _d509756