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_aGnassounou, Bruno _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aTransparency, acquaintance, and modes of presentation |
| 260 | _c2019. | ||
| 500 | _a53 | ||
| 520 | _aNeo-Russellians and neo-Fregeans both claim that some of our thoughts are irreducibly singular, because they are acquaintance-based. This relation of acquaintance imposes a condition of recognitional transparency on the objects of thought: it precludes cases in which two objects of acquaintance, A and B, are the same and yet we fail to know that A is B. To avoid this unwelcome consequence, we can either reject the presentational conception of acquaintance and replace it with a causal conception, as some neo-Russellians do, or we can keep the original notion and make it consistent with the cognitive constraints imposed by Frege’s and Campbell’s puzzles. I argue that this last option is not easily carried out, as the acquaintance constraint affects the modes of presentation themselves and forces them to fulfill two incompatible functions: the function of presenting an object, and the function of singling it out from among other objects. | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nLes Études philosophiques | o 130 | 3 | 2019-08-06 | p. 385-402 | 0014-2166 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-les-etudes-philosophiques-2019-3-page-385?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
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_c510466 _d510466 |
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