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005 | 20250121093023.0 | ||
041 | _afre | ||
042 | _adc | ||
100 | 1 | 0 |
_aLe Guern, Nicolas _eauthor |
245 | 0 | 0 | _aKodak’s missed opportunities in digital imaging technologies: An analysis based on failed strategic choices |
260 | _c2024. | ||
500 | _a49 | ||
520 | _aIn 2012, Kodak filed for bankruptcy, unable to cope with its losses following the gradual disappearance of analogue photography since the turn of the millennium. This industrial failure is often explained by the fact that Kodak, facing a disruptive technology, was confronted with a real dilemma and did not know how to negotiate the shift to digital imaging technologies. Our article rethinks this theory, deemed overly simplistic. Kodak’s well-structured innovation processes allowed the company to study charge-coupled device (CCD) sensor technologies and to create the first magnetic digital camera as early as the 1970s. Although the American group diversified too much in the chemical industry, this did not prevent it from progressively developing a research and development strategy in digital technologies, and launching products that were either analogue-digital hybrids or entirely digital. JEL Codes: L100, L250, L630, N72, O320, 0330 | ||
690 | _adisruptive technology | ||
690 | _adigital photography | ||
690 | _aKodak | ||
690 | _aindustrial research | ||
690 | _adecision | ||
690 | _ainnovation | ||
690 | _adisruptive technology | ||
690 | _adigital photography | ||
690 | _aKodak | ||
690 | _aindustrial research | ||
690 | _adecision | ||
690 | _ainnovation | ||
786 | 0 | _nMarché et organisations | o 50 | 2 | 2024-05-15 | p. 233-264 | 1953-6119 | |
856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-marche-et-organisations-2024-2-page-233?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
999 |
_c515275 _d515275 |