000 | 01707cam a2200277 4500500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
005 | 20250121100941.0 | ||
041 | _afre | ||
042 | _adc | ||
100 | 1 | 0 |
_aAnstey, Mark _eauthor |
245 | 0 | 0 | _aBrexit: internal incoherence, narrow mandating, unwise agreement |
260 | _c2022. | ||
500 | _a28 | ||
520 | _aInterstate negotiations are usually conducted behind closed doors by representatives operating with a mandate from their constituencies or principals. Typically, little is known about the details of these negotiations. However in the case of Brexit, the United Kingdom’s (UK) mandating process was public, affording insight into how its negotiators achieved direction in their dealings and expectations of outcomes. The European Union’s (EU) interests can be seen as largely defensive, directed at mitigating unwanted costs and avoiding outcomes that might further undermine internal coherence. In the context of a deeply divided national constituency, the UK’s mandate was seized by a small group of committed Brexiteers, rather than one consensually negotiated. Using Fisher, Ury, and Patton’s (1991) criteria for a wise agreement, the immediate outcomes of the Brexit agreement are assessed to be unsurprisingly “suboptimal.” | ||
690 | _amandate | ||
690 | _aEuropean Union | ||
690 | _anegotiation | ||
690 | _awise agreement | ||
690 | _aBrexit | ||
690 | _amandate | ||
690 | _aEuropean Union | ||
690 | _anegotiation | ||
690 | _awise agreement | ||
690 | _aBrexit | ||
786 | 0 | _nNégociations | o 36 | 2 | 2022-03-25 | p. 129-147 | 1780-9231 | |
856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-negociations-2021-2-page-129?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
999 |
_c523660 _d523660 |