000			02195cam a2200349 4500500
005			20250121100945.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aLoewener, Franca _eauthor
245	0	0	_aThe virility dilemma: When the emotional costs of deterrence trigger struggles for recognition
260			_c2023.
500			_a58
520			_aIt has been well established that deterrence is a double-edged sword. Many studies show that instead of preventing war, deterrence can lead to war. While the cases in which the “promise of suffering” leads to a security dilemma, and ultimately to war are well documented, the cases in which an actor attempts to deter an adversary would lead to an ontological security dilemma are not. The example of the Moroccan crises of 1905/6 and 1911 shows that threats can destabilize the sense of self of a targeted actor and lead him to seek escalation for symbolic reasons. Indeed, some actors see their self-image called into question by a dissuasive threat insofar as the constraint is equivalent to a form of domination and stigmatization causing great humiliation. This emotion being a particularly powerful motivator, it is not the material costs that dominate the calculations of the actors but the emotional costs. This is particularly valid for state decision-makers who are swayed by virile norms and values. For these actors, backing down from threats may seem more costly than risking one’s physical existence. In these cases, deterrence can turn into a struggle for recognition.
690			_aemotions
690			_avirility
690			_aMoroccan crisis
690			_a(struggle for) recognition
690			_ahumiliation
690			_adecision-making
690			_adeterrence
690			_aNegotiation
690			_aemotions
690			_avirility
690			_aMoroccan crisis
690			_a(struggle for) recognition
690			_ahumiliation
690			_adecision-making
690			_adeterrence
690			_aNegotiation
786	0		_nNégociations | o 39 | 1 | 2023-12-29 | p. 85-104 | 1780-9231
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-negociations-2023-1-page-85?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c523691 _d523691