000			01995cam a2200277zu 4500
001			88923808
003			FRCYB88923808
005			20250107180711.0
006			m o d
007			cr un
008			250107s2021 fr | o|||||0|0|||eng d
020			_a9781773852539
035			_aFRCYB88923808
040			_aFR-PaCSA _ben _c _erda
100	1		_aNorton, John D.
245	0	1	_aThe Material Theory of Induction _c['Norton, John D.']
264		1	_bUniversity of Calgary Press _c2021
300			_a p.
336			_btxt _2rdacontent
337			_bc _2rdamdedia
338			_bc _2rdacarrier
650		0	_a
700	0		_aNorton, John D.
856	4	0	_2Cyberlibris _uhttps://international.scholarvox.com/netsen/book/88923808 _qtext/html _a
520			_aThe fundamental burden of a theory of inductive inference is to determine which are the good inductive inferences or relations of inductive support and why it is that they are so. The traditional approach is modeled on that taken in accounts of deductive inference. It seeks universally applicable schemas or rules or a single formal device, such as the probability calculus. After millennia of halting efforts, none of these approaches has been unequivocally successful and debates between approaches persist. The Material Theory of Induction identifies the source of these enduring problems in the assumption taken at the outset: that inductive inference can be accommodated by a single formal account with universal applicability. Instead, it argues that that there is no single, universally applicable formal account. Rather, each domain has an inductive logic native to it.The content of that logic and where it can be applied are determined by the facts prevailing in that domain. Paying close attention to how inductive inference is conducted in science and copiously illustrated with real-world examples, The Material Theory of Induction will initiate a new tradition in the analysis of inductive inference.
999			_c52652 _d52651