000			02164cam a2200169 4500500
005			20250121111745.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aMisak, Cheryl _eauthor
700	1	0	_a Talisse, Robert B. _eauthor
245	0	0	_aPragmatism, truth, and democracy
260			_c2021.
500			_a41
520			_aThere is growing interest in deliberative democracy, especially the pragmatist version that argues that democratic freedoms and procedures are more likely to get us to the right view of what is true, just, or right. In this time in our history, a focus on truth is more important than ever. We (Robert Talisse and Cheryl Misak) have put forward a position on which we can justify democratic freedoms and procedures on the basis of epistemic reasons. Our very practices of belief and reasoning require that we regard each other as social equals and that the voices of all are taken seriously in our quest for truth. Lever and Chin, in a way that is broadly sympathetic to our general project, have expressed a worry that we are “wrong to suppose that epistemic considerations are better placed than moral considerations when justifying coercive power over others”. In response, we will first distinguish two sites where an epistemic justification of democracy might operate. On our view, the epistemic argument shows why we should be democrats, and the question of how democrats can justify the exercise of coercion is a different matter. We argue that the appropriate reasons we as a society give to justify coercive power over others will indeed be moral. Our point has always been that beliefs about what it is morally right to do must be responsive to reasons, if they are beliefs that are aimed at getting things right. Then the argument for democracy comes in: the best method for getting things right is, broadly speaking, a democratic one. But the reasons that will be in play will be reasons about equality, autonomy, utility, and so on.
786	0		_nRaisons politiques | o 81 | 1 | 2021-03-22 | p. 11-27 | 1291-1941
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-raisons-politiques-2021-1-page-11?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c540724 _d540724