000			00921cam a2200169 4500500
005			20250121113521.0
041			_afre
042			_adc
100	1	0	_aCasamatta, Georges _eauthor
700	1	0	_a Zantman, Wilfried _eauthor
245	0	0	_aAsymmetric Information in a Citizen-Candidate Model
260			_c2002.
500			_a21
520			_aThis article proposes an extension in an asymmetric information framework of the citizen-candidates model developed by Osborne-Slivinsky [1996]. We show that introducing asymmetric information on the tastes of the agents tends to minor the prevalence of median candidates. We also show that this uncertainty leads to an increase in the number of candidates. Classification JEL: D72; D82
786	0		_nRevue économique | 53 | 3 | 2002-07-01 | p. 537-544 | 0035-2764
856	4	1	_uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2002-3-page-537?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999			_c544789 _d544789