| 000 | 00950cam a2200169 4500500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 005 | 20250121113527.0 | ||
| 041 | _afre | ||
| 042 | _adc | ||
| 100 | 1 | 0 |
_aRossignol, Stéphane _eauthor |
| 700 | 1 | 0 |
_a Taugourdeau, Emmanuelle _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aBeveridge or Bismarck, What Consequences for the Welfare of Heterogeneous Agents? |
| 260 | _c2003. | ||
| 500 | _a81 | ||
| 520 | _aWe compare the optimal insurance contribution rate and welfare levels for two opposite social insurance systems: a beveridgean one and a bismarckian one. The social contribution rates are decided by majority voting rule in both cases. In a model where agents earn heterogeneous incomes, we determine which system is preferred by which class of agents.Classification JEL: D7, H5 | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nRevue économique | 54 | 3 | 2003-05-01 | p. 541-550 | 0035-2764 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2003-3-page-541?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
| 999 |
_c544848 _d544848 |
||