000 | 00857cam a2200157 4500500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
005 | 20250121113623.0 | ||
041 | _afre | ||
042 | _adc | ||
100 | 1 | 0 |
_aBien, Franck _eauthor |
245 | 0 | 0 | _aHealth Insurance and Moral Hazard |
260 | _c2004. | ||
500 | _a52 | ||
520 | _aThis paper investigates the impact of health risk on insurance contract with hazard moral. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the type of health risk influences the equilibrium of insurance market. A full coverage is possible with moral hazard. Finally, the link between health risk and co-payment can be invalided.Classification JEL: D8, I1 | ||
786 | 0 | _nRevue économique | 55 | 3 | 2004-05-01 | p. 479-488 | 0035-2764 | |
856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2004-3-page-479?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
999 |
_c545155 _d545155 |