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041 _afre
042 _adc
100 1 0 _aBien, Franck
_eauthor
245 0 0 _aHealth Insurance and Moral Hazard
260 _c2004.
500 _a52
520 _aThis paper investigates the impact of health risk on insurance contract with hazard moral. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the type of health risk influences the equilibrium of insurance market. A full coverage is possible with moral hazard. Finally, the link between health risk and co-payment can be invalided.Classification JEL: D8, I1
786 0 _nRevue économique | 55 | 3 | 2004-05-01 | p. 479-488 | 0035-2764
856 4 1 _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2004-3-page-479?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999 _c545155
_d545155