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041 _afre
042 _adc
100 1 0 _aBelan, Pascal
_eauthor
700 1 0 _a Carré, Martine
_eauthor
700 1 0 _a Gregoir, Stéphane
_eauthor
245 0 0 _aSubsidizing Low-Skilled Jobs in a Dual Labor Market
260 _c2007.
500 _a90
520 _aA large exclusion from the labor market or an important unemployment of lowskilled workers is observed in numerous countries that set a minimum wage. Unemployment benefit or subsidizing low-skilled job policies can be mixed to deal with this situation. We introduce a matching model where (i) co-exist classical and frictional unemployments, (ii) the labor market is dual. Low-skilled jobs pay the minimum wage, while high-skilled wages result from bargaining. High-skilled unemployed can apply for both types of jobs, while opportunities for low-skilled ones are limited to low-skilled jobs. In this set-up, increasing low-skilled job subsidies with a balanced budget does not necessarily reduce low-skilled unemployment or unemployment spells. The model is calibrated for the French labor market. Classifications JEL: H21, H23, J41
786 0 _nRevue économique | 58 | 3 | 2007-05-07 | p. 693-702 | 0035-2764
856 4 1 _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2007-3-page-693?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999 _c545494
_d545494