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005 | 20250121113756.0 | ||
041 | _afre | ||
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100 | 1 | 0 |
_aBonein, Aurélie _eauthor |
245 | 0 | 0 | _aA Theoretical and Empirical Study of Determinants in the Decision-Making Process |
260 | _c2008. | ||
500 | _a68 | ||
520 | _aWe propose in this article some new extensions of the well-known social preferences model of Fehr and Schmidt [1999]: the introduction of opponents’ payoffs differences and a simple element of reciprocity. To test their robustness, we estimate fixed-effects Logit models with collected data on a three-player game with a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Results highlight a strong influence of proposed extensions that don’t display a sense of fairness but rather the self-centered concern. This new model provides a better explanation of individuals’ decisions than the pioneering model of Fehr and Schmidt. Classification JEL: C25, C72, C91, D63 | ||
786 | 0 | _nRevue économique | 59 | 3 | 2008-05-14 | p. 675-684 | 0035-2764 | |
856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2008-3-page-675?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
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_c545614 _d545614 |