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041 _afre
042 _adc
100 1 0 _aBonein, Aurélie
_eauthor
245 0 0 _aA Theoretical and Empirical Study of Determinants in the Decision-Making Process
260 _c2008.
500 _a68
520 _aWe propose in this article some new extensions of the well-known social preferences model of Fehr and Schmidt [1999]: the introduction of opponents’ payoffs differences and a simple element of reciprocity. To test their robustness, we estimate fixed-effects Logit models with collected data on a three-player game with a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Results highlight a strong influence of proposed extensions that don’t display a sense of fairness but rather the self-centered concern. This new model provides a better explanation of individuals’ decisions than the pioneering model of Fehr and Schmidt. Classification JEL: C25, C72, C91, D63
786 0 _nRevue économique | 59 | 3 | 2008-05-14 | p. 675-684 | 0035-2764
856 4 1 _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2008-3-page-675?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999 _c545614
_d545614