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041 _afre
042 _adc
100 1 0 _aAlary, David
_eauthor
700 1 0 _a Bien, Franck
_eauthor
245 0 0 _aHealth Insurance and Adverse Selection
260 _c2008.
500 _a72
520 _aThis paper investigates the impact of chronic diseases on insurance contracts with adverse selection. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the introduction of chronic diseases influences the equilibrium of insurance market. We characterize conditions such that first best contracts can be optimal with asymmetric information. Classification JEL: D82, I1.
786 0 _nRevue économique | 59 | 4 | 2008-07-07 | p. 737-748 | 0035-2764
856 4 1 _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2008-4-page-737?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080
999 _c545617
_d545617