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| 005 | 20250121113815.0 | ||
| 041 | _afre | ||
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| 100 | 1 | 0 |
_aTessier, Philippe _eauthor |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | _aHarsanyi, Sen, or Bentham |
| 260 | _c2009. | ||
| 500 | _a66 | ||
| 520 | _aHealth economists oppose two views of the normative foundations of economic evaluation: a welfarist view, which defines social welfare as a function of individual utilities only, and an extra-welfarist view grounded on Sen’s capability approach. In this paper, we contribute to this debate by investigating the ability of three theories of individual wellbeing (well-being as the satisfaction of preferences, as reported happiness or according to the capability approach) to value individual autonomy and to deal in a satisfactory way with the moral consequences of psychological adaptation. Our analysis underlines the failure of theories of well-being as decision or experienced utility to meet these requirements. We present and discuss possible theoretical and operational solutions using measures of individual well-being relying on Sen’s capability notion and using experienced utility as a valuable functioning. Classification JEL: I10, I31, D61 | ||
| 786 | 0 | _nRevue économique | 60 | 6 | 2009-11-01 | p. 1309-1333 | 0035-2764 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | _uhttps://shs.cairn.info/journal-revue-economique-2009-6-page-1309?lang=en&redirect-ssocas=7080 |
| 999 |
_c545711 _d545711 |
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